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LOCALIZATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN SENTENCING.
REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW EARLY DISPOSITION
DEPARTURE
Michael M. O'Hear'
Abstract: A newly authorized "early disposition departure"
permts federal judges to reduce the sentences of cnminal
defendants who plead guilty quickly pursuant to a locally
adopted early disposition program.
The new departure
mechanism provides the first formal mandate in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines for "localization," that is,
adjusting the sentences of federal defendants based on local
circumstances.
This paper provides a defense of
localization, and suggests that localization may be
reconciled with the Guidelines' overriding objective of
transparency in sentencing. The early disposition departure
provides a model of "transparent localization, but could be
reformed so as to offer both more transparency and more
localization.
Enacted by Congress in 2003, the "Feeney Amendment" is
undoubtedly the most important new federal sentencing statute since the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"), by which Congress created the
United States Sentencing Commission.2 The SRA required the Commission
to implement sentencing guidelines, which dramatically curtailed judicial
discretion at sentencing. Two decades later, the Feeney Amendment
generated considerable controversy by further restricting judicial discretion.3
Yet, the Feeney Amendment also addressed many other aspects of federal
sentencing besides judicial discretion which are only now starting to come
under scrutiny
This Article concerns one of the most notable, yet most neglected,
provisions of the Feeney Amendment: the formal authorization of early
disposition (or "fast-track") programs.4
Such programs offer special

Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School,
1996; B.A., Yale College, 1991.
2
The Feeney Amendment was enacted as Section 401 of the so-called
PROTECT Act (Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) ("PROTECT Act"). For a copy
of the Feeney Amendment, as enacted, see Provisions of Feeney Amendment Passed as
Section 401 of PROTECT Act, 15 Fed. Sent. Rep. 358 (2003).
3
See, e.g., Letters to Congress from Sentencing Comussioners, Judicial
Conference, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 15 Fed. Sent. Rep. 341 (2003).
The statutory language authorizing the implementation of early disposition
programs reads:
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sentencing benefits to defendants who plead guilty very early in the criminal
litigation process; the goal is to encourage pleas that will save the
government the time and expense of preparing for trial. What is most
remarkable about the new "early disposition departure," though, is not the
explicit sentencing discount for guilty pleas; the Sentencing Guidelines have
always included such a discount (albeit in a somewhat different form).5
Rather, the truly striking aspect of the early disposition departure is that this
sentencing benefit will be available in only some of the nation s ninety-four
federal judicial districts. In order for the departure to be implemented in a
particular district, the United States Attorney's Office ("USAO") m that
district will be required to define the categones of eligible defendants in
advance and to justify the need for its program based on particular local
circumstances. 6
The early disposition departure thus represents the first explicit
authorization in the Guidelines for a process that I term "localization," that
is, the adaptation of federal sentencing laws to meet local needs and values.
Localization contrasts with the ideal of national uniformity in sentencing,
which would require all similarly situated federal defendants to receive a
similar sentence, regardless of where geographically they happen to be
convicted. In my view federal sentencing law has long over-emphasized
national uniformity and disregarded the very important benefits of
localization. Accordingly I am heartened by the basic premise of the early
disposition departure. At the same time, the new departure provision (now
set forth as section 5K3.1 of the Guidelines) has been implemented in ways
that do not adequately respect localization values.
In developing these ideas, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I
presents the theoretical case for localization. Part II considers whether
localization violates the essential purpose of the Guidelines. Contrary to the
views of some observers, the chief objective of the Guidelines regime is not
(in) REFORM OF EXISTING PERMISSIBLE GROUNDS OF DOWNWARD

DEPARTURES. - Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the
United States Sentencing Commission shall (2) promulgate, pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code (A) appropriate amendments to the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and
official commentary to ensure that the incidence of downward departures are
substantially reduced;
(B) a policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than 4 levels
if the Government files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early disposition
program authorized by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 675; 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (2003).
5
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E.lI (allowing a two-level
decrease for acceptance of responsibility).
6
In order to implement an early disposition departure program, a USAO must
obtain approval from the United States Attorney General. For a description of the specific
cnteria that will be used in reviewing proposed early disposition programs, see Memorandum
From Attorney General John Ashcroft, United States Department of Justice, to All Federal
Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Fast-Track Memo]. The Fast-Track Memo is
described below in Part III.A.
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national uniformity per se, but, rather, transparency in sentencing (reflecting
such characteristics as certainty predictability and objectivity). Properly
structured, localization does not necessarily contravene the transparency
objective. Part III describes and evaluates section 5K3.1 and the cntena
developed by the Attorney General to implement the new departure. Section
5K3.1 constitutes a new form of "transparent localization" in federal
sentencing, but does not go far enough toward either transparency or
localization. The Article concludes with reform proposals for section 5K3.1
and preliminary thoughts on adapting this new model of localization to
address other problem areas in federal sentencing.
I. THE CASE FOR LOCALIZATION
Localization (tailoring federal sentences to take into account local
circumstances), provides at least two significant benefits: it helps bring local
values to bear in sentencing local crimes, and it facilitates the adaptation of
national criminal justice policies to meet unique local crime-fighting needs.
This Part describes the benefits in greater detail below, and then considers
whether USAOs and district court judges, if given the opportunity would
tend to localize sentences any more effectively than Washington, D.C.-based
institutions like Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the Department
of Justice. This is an important question because, in the absence of any
players m the federal system who are meaningfully responsive to local needs
and values, localization can never be more than a theoretical ideal.
A. Bringing Local Values to Bear
There can be little doubt that different communities across the
country have wildly divergent views as to the seventy of different offenses
and the proper weighing of different variables in the sentencing calculus.
These divergent views manifest themselves m a multitude of contexts. For
instance, state penal laws vary widely in their seventy As one commentator
has observed with respect to state drug laws:
In New York State possessing slightly less than an ounce
of marijuana brings a $100 fine, if it's a first offense. In
Louisiana possessing the same amount of pot could lead to
a prison sentence of twenty years. In Montana selling a
pound of marijuana, first offense, could lead to a life
sentence, whereas in New Mexico selling 10,000 pounds
of marijuana, first offense, could be punished with a prison
term of no more than three years.7
7

ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEx, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE

AMERICAN BLACK MARKET

26 (2003).
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Reflecting such differences, incarceration rates also vary widely from state to
state. While Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas each imprison more than 700
people per 100,000 residents of the state, six other states imprison fewer than
200 per 100,000. s Survey data likewise reveals "strong and consistent"
regional patterns in public views of sentencing policy with New Englanders
indicating the greatest leniency and Central Southerners the least.9
There is no reason to view these differences of opinion as
illegitimate, or even undesirable.
One federal judge has offered the
following example:
Possession of a firearm by a felon will be viewed markedly
differently in Wyoming, where hunting is a way of life,
and in the South Bronx, where a felon with a firearm is a
threat to the community Other things being equal, one
would expect the citizenry of [Wyoming]
to be much
more tolerant of the weapons violator than would the New
Yorker.'o
Who is to say that the people of Wyoming are right and the people of New
York wrong, or vice versa?
In general, local values of this nature ought to play an important role
in federal sentencing. Congress has endorsed "just punishment" as an
appropriate purpose of sentencing." But how is a judge to determine what
punishment is "just" without reference to community values? Since no
objective measure ofjust punishment exists, public opinion must become the
touchstone. 2 The only question is which "public's" opinion ought to
control: the opinion of the local public in the community in which the
offense occurred, or the opinion of the national public as determined by
policymakers sitting in Washington, D.C.?

8 PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, Prisonersin 2001 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
OFF OF JUST. PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. (2002), reprinted in 15 Fed. Sent.
Rep. 66, 67 (2002). The states with the lowest incarceration rates are Maine (127 per 100,000
residents), Minnesota (132), and North Dakota (161). Id.

9
Michael M. O'Hear, National Uniformity / Local Uniformity: Reconsidering
the Use of Departuresto Reduce Federal-StateSentencing Disparities,87 IOWA L. REV. 721,
(discussing PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING FEDERAL CRIMES (1997)) [hereinafter

755-56 (2002)

O'Hear, National Uniformity].
10 Vincent L. Broderick, Local Factors in Sentencing, 5 Fed. Sent. Rep. 314, 314
(1993).
1 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2000).
'2 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV 1, 17 (1998) (noting failure of
proponents of "just deserts" theory of sentencing to "produce a convincing, objective way to
rank cnrmnal behavior").
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In order to maximize overall citizen satisfaction, public choice
theory suggests a general preference for local values over national. 13 By way
of illustration, consider once again the firearms possession example.' 4 A
nationally uniform sentencing guideline in this area would presumably
reflect an average of all citizens' views on the gravity of the offense. This
national average would probably leave many citizens unhappy The people
of Wyoming (and many other states) might find the resulting sentences
unduly harsh, while the people of New York (and many other states) might
find the resulting sentences unduly lenient. By contrast, if each community
were allowed to determine for itself what sentence to apply then fewer
citizens would feel dissatisfied with the sentences handed down in their local
courthouses (which are presumably the sentences that people care about the
most).
Indeed, Congress itself seemed to recognize this point when it
The Commission was
created the Sentencing Commission in 1984.
expressly required to consider the relevance of "the community view of the
gravity of the offense" when drafting the Guidelines." Unfortunately the
Commission did not accept Congress's invitation at the time to incorporate
local values into the federal sentencing calculus.
To be sure, local values ought to give way to national values m some
categories of cases. Consider, for instance, a securities fraud case involving
large numbers of investors spread across the nation (as might be represented
by the Enron case). In such a case, citizens across the country would have a
legitimate interest in the outcome and might rightly feel aggrieved if any
sentence imposed were based on the idiosyncratic local values of the place of
prosecution. Other cases of this nature might include terrorism and national
security cases, prosecutions of multi-state criminal enterprises, and antitrust
cases involving national or international markets.
But the great run of criminal cases involves far more localized
concerns: illegal weapons or drug possession, retail drug trafficking, bank
robbery local political corruption, police brutality low-level frauds, and the
like. In these sorts of cases, the people in the communities affected by the
crimes have a uniquely compelling interest in the sentences imposed and
their views accordingly ought to play a uniquely important role in
determining the sentences.
B. Adapting Sentencing Practices to Meet Local Crime Control Needs
"Just punishment" is not the only recognized purpose of punishment;
Congress has also mandated that sentences reflect crime control objectives,
13
14

O'Hear, National Uniformity, supra note 9, at 755-58.
See Broderick, supra note 10, at 314.

28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4) (2000). Legislative history confirms that Congress
contemplated that the Comrmssion mght take into account regional differences. O'Hear,
National Uniformity, supranote 9, at 743.
15
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represented by such familiar concepts as incapacitation and deterrence.' 6 In
this context, too, local perspectives may have a unique value. Much as "just
punishment" for a particular type of crime vanes from one community to the
next, so, too, does the optimal crime control strategy Thus, for instance,
where stem sentences might have a salutary deterrent effect in some
communities, the same sentences might be counterproductive in others.
After all, the prospect of a harsh sentence may discourage defendants from
entering guilty pleas. 17 When defendants litigate, they consume scarce
judicial and prosecutorial resources, potentially interfering with the
apprehension and prosecution of other offenders. In short, from a crime
control perspective, the decision about whether to impose harsh or lenient
sentences implicates trade-offs. The optimal balancing point may depend on
unique local circumstances, such as local crime rates; the relative capabilities
and resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; and the
extent and nature of organized gang activity
By way of illustration, consider the unique circumstances of the socalled "southwest border districts, i.e., the federal judicial districts that lie
on the Mexican border from Texas to California. By virtue of their location,
these districts experience extraordinarily high levels of illegal immgration
and drug smuggling offenses. Given resource constraints, large numbers of
these cases might slip through the cracks if prosecutors were unable to secure
quick guilty pleas in most cases. Accordingly in the rmd-1990s, prosecutors
in the southwest border districts began to offer special "fast-track"
sentencing benefits to defendants who pled guilty in a sufficiently prompt
fashion.' The new policies had a dramatic effect. For instance, the fasttrack program in the Southern District of California led to a six-fold increase
in annual prosecutions of crirmnal alien cases between 1994 and 2001.19
Thus, while strict application of the Guidelines might have been appropriate
in other districts with different caseloads or resource constraints, the
reduction of sentences through special plea-bargainmg practices may have
represented a better crime control strategy in the southwest border districts.
Once again, Congress recognized as far back as 1984 that local
crime control needs varied and that sentencing practices might have to be
adapted to meet local needs. Specifically Congress asked the Commssion
to consider the relevance of "current incidence of the offense in the
community" when drafting the Guidelines.20
Yet, once again, the
Commission declined the opportunity to incorporate localization explicitly
into the Guidelines.
16
17

18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C) (2000).
See, e.g., Thanassis Cambanis, Trials Rise in US. Court as Plea Deals Are

Spurned, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2004 at BI (discussing nsing trial rates in districts adopting
tougher plea-bargaining policies).
18 Vanessa Blum, Ashcroft Memo Endorses Planfor Swift Pleas, LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2003.
19 Id.
20
28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(7) (2000).
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C. Responsiveness of Federal Officials to Local Values and Needs
Assuming that local values and needs ought to play an important role
in federal sentencing, it is not necessarily clear that United States Attorneys
and federal district court judges have the right incentives to be responsive to
those values and needs. After all, they are unelected officials, appointed by
the President in Washington and lacking any direct accountability on the
local level. Would they not tend to have a national, rather than a local,
perspective on crime and punishment?
While formal local controls may be missing, there is nonetheless
good reason to believe that these local actors are substantially more in tune
with local values and needs than are policymakers in Washington. At the
most basic level, federal judges and prosecutors do not nde a national circuit;
they live in the same communities in which they work, and they must
necessarily develop a sense of the opinions and circumstances of those
communities. Additionally while they do not themselves hold political
office, they are selected through a process in which local political leaders
(especially the local United States Senators) often play a prominent role.
This helps to ensure that federal judges and United States Attorneys have
views that are in line with those of the local political establishment.
Moreover, once appointed, United States Attorneys are subject to ongoing
influence from their legislative patrons, which may be exercised, for
instance, through congressional hearing powers. 21 Finally United States
Attorneys (and perhaps, much less frequently federal judges) may harbor
political ambitions of their own, nicely illustrated by Rudolph Giuliani's rise
from United States Attorney to Mayor of New York City The politically
ambitious United States Attorney will have special incentives to conform
office practices to local values and needs.
Indeed, even in the pre-Feeney federal sentencing system, which
gave no explicit endorsement for localization, there is good reason to believe
that local actors adapted the Guidelines to meet local values and needs. The
original fast-track departures in the southwest border districts may be the
best example, but additional data suggest even more widespread and
systematic localization. Indeed, by some estimates, fast-track programs were
22
ultimately adopted in as many as one-half of the nation s judicial districts.
More generally federal sentences under the Guidelines have vaned
substantially from one district to the next. 3 For instance, researchers have
found important inter-district differences in policies and practices relating to
21

For a discussion of the mechanisms by which federal prosecutors are made

accountable to legislators, see Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion,46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 757 789-93 (1999).
22

See

UNITED

STATES

SENTENCING

COMMISSION,

REPORT

DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
23

O'Hear, National Uniformity, supra note 9, at 745-47
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"downward departures" from the sentencing ranges prescribed by the
Guidelines. 4 Based on their influential analysis of drug sentencing patterns
over the last 10 years, Professors Frank Bowman and Michael Heise
provocatively suggest that, "in place of a single uniform national sentencing
system, the guidelines have created a network of separate local and regional
systems, in each of which the front-line sentencing actors have established a
distinct "equilibrium" as to "the commonly occumng issues in Guidelines
application."2
In short, localization is likely already a well-established
feature of federal sentencing. The next Part, however, will suggest some
legitimate concerns with the current state of affairs.
H. LOCALIZATION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING REGIME
Localization may be an appealing objective for federal sentencing,
but it is surely not the only appealing objective. Indeed, one objection to
localization is that it runs contrary to what one court has called the
"theoretical underpinnings" of the Guidelines: that is, the promotion of
"uniformity among federal courts [across the nation] when imposing
sentences for federal crimes. 2 6 This claim, however, overstates the
centrality of national uniformity to the federal sentencing regime. In lieu of
national uniformity this Part will suggest that the real animating principle of
federal sentencing should be seen as transparency Using transparency as the
chief critenon, this Part will then evaluate federal sentencing practices pre
Feeney focusing particularly on the fast-track programs.
A. Federal Sentencing Reform: One View of the Cathedraf 7
See, e.g., Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REv 569 629-31 (1998)
(comparing the districts of Massachusetts and Connecticut); LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD &
24

JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE

AN EMPIRICAL

YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 9

(1998) (reporting

results of survey of federal prosecutors revealing different views on when substantial
assistance motion may be made). See also Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea
Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW U. L. REv. 1284, 1292 (1997) ("Huge
deviations from proper Guidelines sentences are rare in most districts, but frequent in a few.").
25
Frank 0. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a
Decade ofDecliningFederalDrug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV 1043, 1135 (2001).

United States v Snyder, 136 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 1998).
I borrow this phrase from Gudo Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv L. REv 1089
(1972). In offering one view of their subject, Calabresi and Melamed acknowledged the value
of alternative views: their article was "meant to be only one of Monet's paintings of the
Cathedral at Rouen. To understand the Cathedral one must see all of them. Id. at 1089 n.2
Similarly, I acknowledge that other persuasive accounts of federal sentencing reform are
possible. The point of this Section is not to provide a single, comprehensive theory of federal
26

27
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In order to understand the "theoretical underpinnings" of the
Guidelines, there can be no more authoritative source than Judge Marvin E.
Frankel's celebrated indictment of pre-Guidelines sentencing, Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order25 Frankel's book, widely credited with
developing and promoting the concept of a sentencing commission
possessing law-making authority has been called the "cornerstone" of the
29
federal sentencing reform efforts in Congress in the 1970s and 1980s.
Indeed, Senator Edward Kennedy himself - the principal sponsor of the bill
in 1984 that created the Commission and authorized the Guidelines - has
called Frankel the "father of sentencing reform."30
Frankel's book grew out of his experiences as a federal district court
judge in the era of indeterminate sentencing. Under this regime, judges
imposed sentences within broad ranges, typically extending from probation
up to a statutory maximum term of imprisonment. With virtually no
appellate review of sentences, district court judges exercised vast
discretion.31 A parole board would ultimately set the actual release date of
prisoners, but within constraints determined by the judge's sentence.32 The
sentencing judge thus played a crucial role in determining the magnitude of
criminal punishments, but operated with little guidance from either the
legislature or the appellate courts.
Lying at the heart of his critique, Frankel argued, in the strongest
terms, that the indeterminate system violated bedrock rule of law principles:
[O]ur laws characteristically leave to the sentencing judge
a range of choice that should be unthinkable in a
"government of laws, not of men
[T]he almost wholly unchecked and sweeping
powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences
are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes
devotion to the rule of law "
Frankel emphasized that this system deprived defendants of the ability to
anticipate what punishments they would receive:

sentencing, but to demonstrate that there are alternatives to common accounts that emphasize
national uniformity, and that these alternative views are at least as persuasive.
28
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
29
Kate Stith & Steve Y Koh, The Politicsof Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
Historyof the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 228 (1993).
30
31
32

Id.

Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226-27

In general, release dates could not occur before one-third, or

after two-thirds, of the sentence imposed had actually been served. Id. at 227
33 FRANKEL, supra note 28, at 5.
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[F]ederal trial judges, answerable only to their varieties of
consciences, may and do send people to prison for terms
that vary in any given case from none at all up to five, ten,
thirty or more years. This means in the great majority of
federal criminal cases that a defendant who comes up for
sentencing has no way of knowing or reliably predicting
whether he will walk out of the courtroom on probation, or
be locked up for a term of years that may consume the rest
of his life, or something in between.
Defendants and their lawyers are able to
anticipate within broad ranges in a fair number of cases. It
is unlikely that the convicted murderer will be freed on the
spot - though he may be. There are cases (depending on
the judge) in which probation is a good bet, though not a
sure thing. But the law as it is written, and as it operates
upon hapless defendants, is not significantly more
knowable or predictable than the unregulated sentencing
provisions indicate on their face. 4

Frankel contrasted this sentencing system with the norms found
elsewhere in the law which seek to provide citizens with more meaningful
advance notice of the consequences of their actions:
In most matters of the civil law while our success is
variable, the quest is steadily for certainty predictability,
objectivity The businessman wants to know what the tax
will be on the deal, what the possible "exposure" may be
from one risk or another. His lawyer may predict more or
less successfully But what no businessman wants (if he is
honest) is a system of "individualized" taxes and
exposures, depending upon who the judge or other official
may turn out to be and how that decision-maker
may
35
assess the case and the individual before hUm.
Frankel's triumvirate of "certainty predictability objectivity" - the norms
around which he built his influential reform proposal - will be referred to
here, for shorthand's sake, as "transparency
Frankel saw transparency as not only an essential component of the
rule of law - and thus integral to our most fundamental notions of justice but also as an important contributor to the rehabilitation of prisoners:

34
3s

Id. at 6.
Id.at 10.
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The absence of any explanation or purported justification
for the sentence is among the more familiar and
understandable sources of bitterness among people in
prison. Philosophers have agreed for ages on the ideal that
the person suffering punishment should be guided to
understand and, in the ultimate hope, realize the justice of
the affliction. Our practice of terse dispositions is at the
opposite pole
The splatter of vaned sentences, with
the unexplained variations left to be seen as random or
worse, nourishes the view that there is no justice in the
law
The prevalence of this resentful outlook is attested
by prisoners themselves, by attentive jailers, and by other
students of the subject. More than one writer has taught
that the hope of rehabilitating offenders is blighted at the
inception by this rankling sense of injustice.36
Frankel's ideal of transparency in sentencing seemed to possess
several distinct features. First, sentences should be based on a set of
guidelines ("a detailed chart or calculus") identifying the set of relevant
considerations and the weight to be given each. 3 Second, the guidelines
should be amenable to objective application; at sentencing, distinctions
should not be made among defendants "unless they can be justified by
relevant tests capable of formulation and application with sufficient
objectivity to ensure that the results will be more than the idiosyncratic
ukases of particular officials., 3' Third, defendants and others should have
the opportunity to "persuade or enlighten" the judge as to the application of
the guidelines.39 Fourth, sentencing decisions should be explained; "[s]ecret
decisions bear no credentials of care or legitimacy
,40 And, fifth,
sentences should be subject to meaningful appellate review (which is, of
course, greatly facilitated by the development of detailed sentencing
guidelines).4 '
These five objectives (detailed guidance, objective criteria, heanng
rights, public explanation, and appellate review) were ultimately embodied
(to a greater or lesser extent) in the 1984 law that produced the Commssion
and the Guidelines. Indeed, in the statute Congress - echoing Frankel mandated that the Commission, in promulgating the Guidelines, pay
"particular attention" to providing certainty and fairness i sentencing. ''42
36

Id. at 42-44.

37

Id.at 113.
Id. at 11.
FRANKEL, supra note 28, at 113.
Id. at 49, 108.
See id. at 84-85, 113.
28 U.S.C. § 994(0 (emphasis added) (2000).

11
39
40
41
42
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Thus, the Guidelines were to categorize offenses and offenders, and to
establish narrow sentencing ranges applicable to each,4 3 leaving
comparatively little unguided discretion to the sentencing judge. For
purposes of creating the categories, Congress identified eighteen specific
criteria that the Commission might take into account. 44 For purposes of
applying the Guidelines (once drafted), Congress required that a presentence
investigation report (PSIR) be prepared by a probation officer in each case,45
and that the report be shared with the defendant in advance of sentencing,4 6
presumably to ensure that defendants would have a fair heanng on issues
raised by the PSIR. Congress further required that the sentencing court "at
the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition
of the particular sentence.'4 7 Finally Congress provided for appellate review
of sentences, including their conformity with the Guidelines. 4' There should
be little surprise that while Frankel later expressed some discomfort with the
way the Commission implemented the Congressional scheme, 49 he initially
welcomed the 1984 law as a "promising expenment."5 0
Thus far, I have presented the case that transparency and the rule of
law not national uniformity ought to be regarded as the overarching purpose
of the Guidelines system. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that
there is a relationship between national uniformity and transparency- a truly
uniform national sentencing system - in which similarly situated defendants
all across the country would receive similar sentences for similar misconduct
- would likely be marked by a high degree of transparency It is difficult to
imagine anything approaching national uniformity in the absence of detailed,
objective guidelines and searching appellate scrutiny of sentences. Thus, a
system that strove to achieve national uniformity above all else would likely
advance the cause of transparency at the same time, even if only incidentally
However, while national uniformity might be one way to achieve
transparency it is not the only way
For instance, we might imagine a
system in which each district adopted its own local sentencing guidelines,
much as each district presently has its own set of local rules of procedure.
Such local guidelines might be as detailed and objective as the current
Federal Guidelines, or perhaps even more so, thereby providing all parties
with ample predictability and certainty in sentencing. Indeed, in the real
world, local guidelines rmght deliver considerably more transparency than
national guidelines. Local guidelines might be better adapted to local needs
43
44
45
46

47
48

49

28 U.S.C. § 994(b).
28 U.S.C. §§ 994(c)-(d).
18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (2000).
18 U.S.C. §3552(d).
18 U.S.C. §3553(c) (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b) (2000).

See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative

Collaboration,101

L.J. 2043, 2047 (1992) (criticizing severity of Guidelines).
Orland, Sentencing Commissions and
Guidelines, 73 GEo. L.J. 225, 246 (1984).
50
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and values, and local prosecutors and judges might be less inclined to try to
circumvent them.5 '
In any event, the central point here is that our current system is not
premised on national uniformity Frankel was concerned with bringing the
rule of law to sentencing; he did not identify national uniformity as an end in
and of itself, or even as a preferred means to the end of transparency Nor
did Congress, in bringing Frankel's vision to life, seem to place any
particular emphasis on national uniformity Quite the contrary Congress
authorized the Commission, when drafting the Guidelines, to take into
account such local considerations as "community view of the gravity of the
offense" and "current incidence of the offense in the community "" Indeed,
Congress went so far as to authorize the Commission to modify the
Guidelines with respect to particular defendants based on the community
view of the gravity of the offense. 3
To be sure, along with certainty and fairness in sentencing, Congress
also emphasized the reduction of "unwarranted sentencing disparities" as a
central purpose of the Guidelines.14 Proponents of national uniformity rely
on this language in claiming statutory support for their position."5 Yet,
properly understood, the language is merely question-begging. When is a
sentencing disparity "unwarranted" 9 When two similarly situated defendants
are sentenced differently in different districts based on genuine differences in
community values or crime-fighting needs, can we truly call the disparity
"unwarranted" 9 The statute provides no explicit answer to this question, but
sections referencing community views and circumstances at least implicitly
suggest a response in the negative.
B. Transparency and Federal Sentencing Before Feeney
Despite the promise that Frankel saw in the 1984 law the Guidelines
regime has not fulfilled expectations of delivering transparency in
sentencing. One problem - largely lying beyond the scope of this Article - is
the complexity of the Guidelines. While Frankel endorsed the concept of
detailed, objective guidance, he did not foresee the possibility that they might
be too much of a good thing. In practice, the Guidelines frequently require
the sentencing court to conduct fact-finding on a multitude of distinct
sentencing criteria (e.g., drug quantities, role in the offense, use of a gun).
As the contingencies multiply each with its own particular effect on the
s1 Some scholars have found circumvention to be common under the current
system in at least some districts. See, e.g., Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 24, at 1292.
Circumvention effectively supplants the written Guidelines with the idiosyncratic preferences
of judges and prosecutors, thereby raising substantial transparency concerns.
52
28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4), (7) (2000).
3 28 U.S.C. § 994(s).
54 28 U.S.C. § 994(f).
55 See, e.g., Snyder 136 F.3d at 68-69.
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applicable Guidelines range, the predictability of the sentence to be imposed
evaporates.
Transparency has also been undermined by two other aspects of the
Guidelines that bear more directly on the concerns of this Article. First, the
Guidelines left charging and plea-bargaining largely untouched . 6 Thus,
while judges are now subject to detailed guidance in determining a sentence,
prosecutors have broad discretion in determining the offense of conviction,
which establishes the statutory parameters within which a sentence must be
imposed and constitutes the starting point for Guidelines analysis.
Moreover, while the Guidelines, in theory mandate "real-offense"
sentencing (sentencing based on the defendant's actual conduct, not the
offense of conviction)," prosecutors are not likely to undermine their own
plea deals by seeking a sentence that goes beyond the scope of the offense of
conviction. Indeed, in conjunction with plea-bargaining, prosecutors may
agree with defendants to a set of stipulated facts upon which the sentence
will be based. 8 Additionally in plea-bargaining prosecutors may agree to
make, or at least not oppose, a motion to depart downward from the
applicable Guidelines range (about which more will be said shortly). In
short, prosecutors have considerable power to control how cases are
sentenced, particularly the great majonty of cases that are resolved by way of
plea-bargaining. That power, however, is subject to none of the transparency
constraints otherwise emphasized in the Guidelines; there is no binding
guidance on plea-bargaining and no meaningfil judicial review to ensure that
it is conducted in an even-handed manner. Where defendants were once
subject to the whims of the judge at sentencing, they are now subject to the
whims of the prosecutor.
Second, the Guidelines created an ill-defined departure mechanism
that empowered judges to sentence outside the prescribed range in two
different circumstances: (1) when the government moves for departure on the
ground that the defendant "has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense"5 9 and (2) when "there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines
that should result in a sentence different from that prescribed., 60 Because it
is premised on a government motion, the substantial assistance departure
puts considerable sentencing power into the hands of prosecutors, where it
may be exercised in an uncontrolled and unpredictable manner. Because of
vagaries in the standards governing both forms of departure, different
56
See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 12, at 30. "The Guidelines seek to change existing
plea bargaining practices only slightly. Id.

7
5s
59

U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.3(b).
U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B 1.4(a).
U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI. 1.

60

U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §

5K2.0.
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prosecutors and judges have interpreted the scope of the departures powers
quite differently 61 Overall, departures have become increasingly common,
amounting to more than one-third of all cases.62 Moreover, once the court
decides to grant a departure, the Guidelines say hardly anything about the
appropriate scale of the departure. Before the Feeney Amendment, appellate
review was subject to the deferential abuse of discretion standard. 63 Thus,
the departure mechanism has also likely worked to undermine the
transparency in sentencing envisioned by Frankel: it is hard to say in advance
whether it will be available in any given case, and, if so, how great a benefit
it will provide to the defendant.
The pre-Feeney fast-track programs illustrate some of the issues. Set
up by prosecutors, these programs would provide some special benefit (such
as a departure motion or a favorable charge bargain) to specified categories
of defendants for a quick plea.64 While judges could reject the deal, they
almost never did so because of their interest (shared with prosecutors) in
resolving cases quickly 65
Thus, prosecutors really controlled the
administration of the fast-track benefits. While USAOs may have developed
detailed guidance on when the benefit should be given, the system lacked at
least three hallmarks of a transparent sentencing regime: public explanation,
public hearing opportunities, and outside review of the key decisions. In
particular, the prosecutor's decision to deny a fast-track benefit to a
particular defendant could be been made in secret without any sort of an
appellate process.
Deeper transparency problems lay at a programmatic level. USAOs
were not subject to guidance with respect to when it was appropriate to adopt
a fast-track program, or what might be included in such a program. The
public had no right to be heard in the process of developing a program. No
explanation was required of the decision to adopt (or not adopt) a program,
and no outside review was available to determine if the decision was
adequately justified.
Indeed, an adopted program might have been
inconsistent at a fundamental level with the Guidelines themselves." Thus,
fast-track programs justifiably gave rise to public perceptions of the very
lawlessness in sentencing to which Frankel objected.

O'Hear, National Uniformity, supra note 9, at 746-47
U. S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 3 1.
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
64
For a thorough assessment of the fast-track programs, see Laura Storto, Getting
Behind the Numbers: A Report on Four Districts and What They Do "Below the Radar
Screen" 16-34 (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
61
62
63

61

Id. at26.

66

Id. at 9 (arguing that dismissal of charges pursuant to San Diego's fast-track

program violated restrictions on plea-bargaining set forth in U. S. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

§ 6B1.2); Michael M. O'Hear, Cooperation and Accountability After the Feeney
Amendment, 16 FED. SENT. REP. _,
(2003) (arguing that fast-track departures violated the
spirit of pre-Feeney Guidelines).
MANUAL

-
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In short, the fast-track programs, perhaps the quintessential form of
pre-Feeney localization in federal sentencing, fell short of the transparency
ideals embodied in the Guidelines system. They point to the need for formal
localization mechanisms within the Guidelines themselves, mechanisms that
operate m a manner that is transparent from the perspective of defendants
and the public at large.
III. The Feeney Amendment's Early Disposition Departure
Localization existed prior to the Feeney Amendment, but lacked
structure and clear authorization in the Guidelines, and developed in a
somewhat secretive and unsystematic manner through departures, pleabargaining and charging practices, and a myriad of case-by-case Guidelines
application decisions. Viewing this messy and opaque state of affairs,
members of Congress mght reasonably reach the conclusion that Frankel's
ideals of the rule of law had been seriously compromised. Passage of the
Feeney Amendment seems to represent, among other things, an attempt by
Congress to enhance the transparency of federal sentencing.
Indeed, many of the most notable features of the Feeney Amendment
can be explained with reference to this objective. First, the Feeney
Amendment seeks to rein in prosecutorial discretion in plea-bargaining - one
of the great pieces of unfinished business left from the 1984 law In
particular, the Attorney General is asked to adopt new policies and
procedures to "ensure that Department of Justice attorneys oppose sentencing
adjustments, including downward departures, that are not supported by the
facts and the law ,,67 Second, the Feeney Amendment also imposes new
restrictions on the ability of district courts to employ the departure
mechanism. Not only are departures now subject to de novo review in the
courts of appeal, 6 but the Commssion has also been directed to amend the
Guidelines to reduce the frequency of departures. 69
Of greatest interest for present purposes, though, the Feeney
Amendment also attempts to bring the local fast-track programs within the
Guidelines structure by creating a new early disposition departure. It is here
that the Feeney Amendment most clearly grapples with the challenge of
reconciling localization and transparency Accordingly this Part begins with
a description of early disposition departure, both as it has been established in
the statute and as it has been implemented thus far by the Sentencing
Commission and the Department of Justice. Next, this Part will evaluate the
early disposition departure as a model for transparent localization.

67
61

69

PROTECT Act § 401(I)(1).
PROTECT Act § 401 (d)(2).
PROTECT Act § 401(m)(2)(A).
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A. The New Departure
In terse language, the Feeney Amendment authorizes an up to fourlevel "downward departure" for defendants who plead guilty pursuant to an
authorized early disposition program.7 ° While denominated a "departure,
the new provision differs from the Guidelines' pre-existing departure
provisions (sections 5K1.1 and 5K2.0) inasmuch as the magnitude of the
departure is subject to an explicit cap (the defendant's "offense level" is
reduced by up to four levels 71). Additionally the departure is not
automatically available in all districts. Rather, the departure will only be
available in districts that adopt an early disposition program and obtain
approval for that program from the United States Attorney General.7 2 Thus,
the Feeney Amendment provides, for the first time, a clear basis in the law
for the locally initiated fast-track programs. At the same time, by capping
benefits at four levels and requiring Attorney General authorization, the
Feeney Amendment subjects the fast-track programs to much greater
centralized control.
While the Feeney Amendment mandated creation of the new
departure, Congress left it to the Sentencing Commission to make the
particular Guidelines amendments necessary to implement the departure.
Thus, the Commission has promulgated new section 5K3.1, which largely
tracks the statutory language in authorizing a downward departure of not
more than four levels. 73 Departure requires a motion from the government
made pursuant to an authorized early disposition program. The Commission
provided no additional guidance for the new departure. For instance, while
the Commission suggested that the sentencing court will have discretion in
deciding whether to grant a departure ("the court may depart"), the
Commission did not provide a standard to govern this exercise of
discretion.74 Nor did the Commission identify any particular circumstances
in which the court might appropriately deny a government motion.
Likewise, other than capping the departure at four levels, the Commission
did not offer any guidance as to the proper magnitude of departure.
The Attorney General offered his own set of implementation
pnnciples for "fast-track" departures in his memorandum to all U.S.
Attorneys dated September 22, 2003 (the "Fast-Track Memo"). 75 These
principles will play a crucial role in determining what effect section 5K3.1
ultimately has, because Attorney General authorization is a necessary
PROTECT Act § 401 (m)(2)(B).
Under the Guidelines, a defendant's sentencing range is deterrmned based on a
combination of the defendant's offense level and the defendant's criminal history. The actual
effect of reducing the offense level by four depends on the initial offense level and the
cnrminal history, but may amount to several years' imprisonment in some cases.
72
PROTECT Act § 401(m)(2)(B).
73 U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1.
74 id.
75 Fast-Track Memo, supra note 6.
70
71

HeinOnline -- 27 Hamline L. Rev. 374 2004

LOCALIZATION IN SENTENCING

2004]

prerequisite to granting an early disposition departure. Pursuant to the
Attorney General's Memo, in order to obtain authorization to operate an
early disposition program, a USAO must demonstrate that:
(A)
(1) the district confronts an exceptionally large
number of a specific class of offenses within the district,
and failure to handle such cases on an expedited "fasttrack" basis would significantly strain prosecutorial and
judicial resources available in the district; or (2) the district
confronts some other exceptional local circumstance with
respect to a specific class of cases that justifies expedited
disposition of such cases;
(B)
declination of such cases in favor of state
prosecution is either unavailable or clearly unwarranted;
(C)
the specific class of cases consist of ones that are
highly repetitive and present substantially similar fact
scenarios; and
(D)
the cases do not involve an offense that has been
designated76 by the Attorney General as a "crime of
violence. ,
The Fast-Track Memo also identifies certain features that will be
required of all authorized early disposition programs. In order to qualify for
departure, for instance, the defendant will have to plead guilty "within a
reasonably prompt period after the filing of federal charges. 77 Additionally
the defendant must agree to a factual basis that accurately reflects the offense
conduct and must also waive Rule 12(b)(3) motions, appeals, and postconviction challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.78
Some matters are left to the discretion of the USAOs. For instance,
each qualifying USAO may determine the magnitude of the departure (up to
four levels), or choose to leave the question to the sentencing judge.79
Alternatively the USAO may employ charge-bargaining in its fast-track
program, so long as the resulting sentence reductions are "commensurate
with" the authorized downward departure. 0
76

Id. at 2.

77

id.

78

See id. at 3. An exception to the § 2255 waiver is permitted for claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel.
79
See id.
8o
Id. Charge-bargaining contemplates a promise by the prosecutor to dismiss (or
not file) some charges in return for an agreement by the defendant to plead guilty to less
serious charges.
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B. Evaluation: Section 5K3.1 and Transparent Localization
The Feeney Amendment seems to bring new transparency to fasttrack programs. At the most basic level, giving explicit authorization to fasttrack sentencing addresses perceptions of lawlessness, that is, the persistent
sense that fast-track programs violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Guidelines regime. Furthermore, at a programmatic level, the Feeney
Amendment and its implementing documents also bring a new measure of
transparency In particular, the Attorney General's Fast-Track Memo offers
guidance for the first time on when a fast-track program may appropriately
be adopted, and requires an explanation for such a program at the time of its
proposal.
Section 5K3.1 may thus be viewed as something of a model for
localization within the Guidelines regime. The early disposition departure
demonstrates the political viability of bringing local circumstances and
values to bear in an explicit and meaningful way in determining federal
sentences.
At the same time, the new departure falls short of our transparency
ideals in several important respects. Broadly speaking, section 5K3.1
replicates one of the basic errors of the Guidelines regime by placing too
much power in the hands of prosecutors and permitting that power to be
exercised without public explanation or external review
Consider the uncertainties facing a defendant in a district that has an
approved early disposition program. Even assuming that the program has
clear, detailed, objective criteria, the prosecutor ultimately determines how
and if, those criteria will be applied in any given case. Defendants have little
assurance that the criteria will be applied m an even-handed manner.
Defendants have no right to be heard on the applicability of fast-track, no
right to an explanation if the prosecutor refuses to make an early disposition
motion, and no right to judicial (or other external) review of the prosecutor's
decision.
Even if the defendant wins a motion from the prosecutor,
considerable uncertainty remains. Section 5K3.1 provides that a judge
"may" grant the motion, but the judge need not do so. While judges will
presumably defer to prosecutors in most cases, the uncertainty remains,
exacerbated by the absence of any guidance from any source as to what may
justify the denial of an early disposition departure motion. Will the judge be
expected to conduct an independent inquiry into whether the defendant has
complied with the terms of the early disposition program? Will the judge
have discretion to deny a departure because the resulting sentence would
violate the judge's view as to what a just sentence would be?
Similar uncertainties surround the magnitude of the departure.
Section 5K3.1 indicates that a departure may be as much as four levels, but
does not offer any guidance as to how much a judge should depart within the
range of one to four (which, depending on the case, may result in a swing of
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several years of imprisonment for the defendant). Prosecutors may or may
not make a recommendation in this regard, and the judge may or may not
accept such a recommendation if it is made. And, if the final sentence
imposed leaves the defendant disappointed, it is not clear how a defendant
could obtain meaningful appellate review in the absence of any real legal
standards to apply in the Section 5K3.1 determination.
Uncertainties also plague section 5K3.1 at the programmatic level.
While the Feeney Amendment and the Fast-Track Memo are to be applauded
for bringing some transparency to the process of creating fast-track
programs, important gaps remain. Most fundamentally the public lacks any
ability to participate meaningfully in the process, such as the familiar notice
and comment procedures in administrative law Moreover, while USAOs
must justify proposals to initiate an early disposition program, there is no
requirement that decisions not to make a proposal be justified. The public
has no formal mechanism to prompt local consideration of a section 5K3 I
program, and no way to be assured otherwise that the local USAO has given
due consideration to the possibility of adopting such a program. In short, the
transparency (such as it is) works asymmetrically" the procedural safeguards
apply only to the adoption of a program, not to the refusal to adopt a
program.
Furthermore, if the process created by the Attorney General may be
criticized as inadequately transparent, it is equally subject to criticism as
insufficiently supportive of localization. In particular, the Attorney General
has been unduly restrictive in the cntena adopted for early disposition
programs. For instance, the Fast-Track Memo suggests that such programs
should be limited to "exceptional circumstances,"'s although the statute
contains no such limitation. In pre-Feeney practice, early disposition
programs were routine, not exceptional, and Congress has not indicated that
it wished to change that practice. Other criteria (no crimes of violence,
highly repetitive fact patterns, etc.) likewise lack a clear justification and
may result in unnecessary limitations on the ability of USAOs to adapt
federal sentencing local circumstances.
C. Improving the Early Disposition Departure
To some, the preceding comments may suggest that section 5K3.1
strikes an appropriate balance: if the provision can be criticized from both a
transparency and a localization perspective, then it avoids going too far in
either direction.
However, such a response wrongly assumes that
transparency and localization are in zero-sum balance. This Section suggests
that there may be ways to improve the early disposition departure such that it
is both more transparent and more respectful of localization values.

81 Fast-Track Memo, supra note 6, at 2.
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Beginning at an abstract level, we might ground the analysis in a
basic procedure/substance distinction. Transparency values are essentially
about procedure (i.e., how the sentence is determined), while localization is
fundamentally concerned with substance (i.e., what the sentence is, in
relation to local values and circumstances). While the precise boundaries
between substance and procedure are admittedly imprecise, the conceptual
distinction may nonetheless help better define what aspects of the early
disposition departure should be subject to nationally uniform federal
standards and what aspects should be put in the hands of local actors.
Specifically the federal government (in the form of Congress, the
Commission, and/or the Attorney General) should act to enhance the
transparency of the procedures relating to early disposition departures (at
both the programmatic and case-specific levels). This would work to reduce
the substantive constraints on the ability of local actors to design and
implement their own early disposition programs. A more specific reform
agenda is outlined below
1. Provide for Greater Public Participation in Program Creation
Part I of this article presented the case that the various USAOs are
likely responsive to local values and circumstances. At the same time, that
responsiveness can only be enhanced if the public has an opportunity to
participate in important decisions like the creation of an early disposition
program. Moreover, such participation will help to reassure the public that
the USAO is acting in a principled manner based on clear criteria when it
implements (or chooses not to implement) an early disposition program.
At a minimum, public participation should include notice and
comment rights m connection with the Attorney General's consideration of
whether to approve a proposed program. More ambitiously the public could
have a role in the USAO's consideration of whether to propose a program
(and, if so, the consideration of how the program would be structured).
Either way in order to assure some measure of respect for the public s role,
the decision-making agency should provide a public explanation for its
decision to authorize (or not to authorize) an early disposition program, and
address significant issues arising from the public comment process.
2. Refocus AG's Criteriafor Program Approval
Consistent with localization values, early disposition programs
should be approved by the Attorney General when they can be justified by
reference to local circumstances. There is no good reason to decree a priori
that such programs will be "exceptonal. ' 2 If USAOs can routinely justify
82

Fast-Track Memo, supra note 6, at 3. "These programs are properly reserved

for exceptional circumstances

Id.
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early disposition benefits in light of local values and crime-fighting needs,
then routine they should be. Likewise, the Attorney General should eschew
program criteria that would serve, without good reason, to limit the
flexibility of USAOs in designing programs that actually address local
circumstances. The prohibition on including crimes of violence within early
disposition programs might amount to just such an artificial constraint.
Because of the particularly high levels of public concern surrounding violent
crime, one imagines that USAOs would not generally wish to provide special
sentencing benefits to violent offenders. But if a USAO nonetheless chose to
include some categories of violent crime within an early disposition
proposal, that proposal should not be rejected out of hand.
The Attorney General's criteria should instead focus the attention of
USAOs (and interested members of the public) on what really matters in this
context: would the proposed early disposition benefit facilitate the
prosecution of federal offenses that would otherwise not be prosecuted at all
(or at least not be effectively prosecuted) 9 And, would the benefit still allow
for a sufficiently high level of punishment in light of community values?
Assuming both questions are answered in the affirmative, there should be a
strong presumption in favor of approving the proposal.8 3
3. Require Clear Objective Departure Criteria
To obtain approval, an early disposition program should define
precisely what a defendant is required to do in order to gain the early
disposition benefit. The program should also define the magnitude of
departure available m each type of case covered by the program. Leaving
defendants in doubt as to such important matters would give rise to just the
sorts of perceptions of arbitrariness in sentencing that were of such concern
to Frankel.
4. Remove the Prosecutor's Role as Gatekeeper
The early disposition departure should not require a prosecutor's
motion. Prosecutonal decision-making is a black box; without required
explanation or review such decision-making contravenes the transparency
ideal. Instead, the judge should have the final say in determining whether the
defendant has complied with the requirements of the early disposition
program. If these requirements are satisfied, then the departure should be
granted. Judicial decision-making is preferable to prosecutorial decision-

83

One additional consideration may be whether the proposal encompasses

categories of offenses that are more genuinely national than local in nature. Such offenses
(national secunty cnmes, international drug trafficking enterpnses, frauds on national
secunties markets, and the like) should be excluded from early disposition programs because
the public choice justification for localization in those cases is relatively weak.
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making because of the established requirements of due process in the
courtroom, explanation of the sentence, and appellate review
This reform would reduce, but by no means eliminate, prosecutonal
discretion in implementing the section 5K3.1 departure. For instance, the
prosecutor might choose to charge a case so as to remove it from the scope of
the early disposition program. Relatively weak counts might be added to the
indictment, and then dismissed once the time has passed for the defendant to
comply with the terms of early disposition program. Judges should have the
authority to inquire into complaints of prosecutorial manipulation of this
nature, and to depart downward where such a remedy is necessary to correct
a manifest injustice.
IV CONCLUSION
De facto localization has likely been a persistent feature of federal
sentencing. For the first time, though, the Guidelines have now incorporated
a form of dejure localization through Section 5K3.1. 84 Dejure localization is
preferable to de facto because it is more consistent with the transparency
ideals that undergird the Guidelines. Section 5K3.1 thus represents an
important and underappreciated breakthrough in federal sentencing law
At the same time, section 5K3.1 (and the Fast-Track Memo
necessary for its implementation) does not go far enough. Because it leaves
too much unreviewable discretion, exercised outside of public view in the
hands of prosecutors, the public cannot be assured that the new departure
mechanism will be implemented in a consistent, pnncipled manner. Because
the Attorney General has adopted unnecessarily restrictive review criteria,
few districts may have the ability to adopt early disposition programs that
would help to adjust federal sentences to local realities. This Article has
suggested a number of reforms to address these deficiencies.
Whether reformed or not, the successes and failures of section 5K3.1
should be monitored carefully in the coming years. The provision may prove
to be a helpful model for focused, transparent localization in other areas of
the Guidelines. Perhaps most urgently, the substantial assistance provision
requires significant restructuring. Section 5K1.1 has been implemented quite
differently from district to district. This de facto localization raises
important transparency concerns. Substantial assistance has been plagued by
perceptions of arbitrariness and bias in its application.85 Reform might
involve the development of clear, objective, nationally uniform standards;
however, this approach would likely be resisted in many districts. Such a
reform would not only be difficult to enforce, but (to whatever extent the
new standards were successfully implemented) would hinder the ability of
"De facto localization" refers to the real-world fact of localization, as noted
above in Part I.C. "De jure localization" refers to a formal recognition of localization in the
law.
MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 24, at 15.
85
94
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local actors to adapt sentences to meet local circumstances. Instead of the
nationally uniform approach, a better reform strategy might be to adopt the
section 5K3.1 model. Each district would be given the opportunity to
develop its own substantial assistance standards through an open,
deliberative process, subject to review by the Attorney General to ensure
compliance with the basic goals of section 5Kl.1 and the ideals of
transparent sentencing.
Proponents of the Guidelines regime have often acted as if that
regime were fundamentally incompatible with localization. The Feeney
Amendment has wisely rejected that position. Yet, the new section 5K3.1
departure is only a starting point in the process of bnnging a new transparent
localization to federal sentencing.
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